Sunday, May 10, 2020

Footnote kg97

kg97. The reader will notice that this essay pays a great deal of attention to Russell. Why, you say, so much fuss about Russell's efforts to see beyond the veil into the mystery of human existence? After all, this essay is supposed to be a critique of Ryle, not Russell. I reply that one may well doubt that Ryle could have ever solved the alleged mind-body problem, given the earnest, but ultimately unsuccessful, efforts of a philosopher of Russell's stature. In addition, I found it very useful, in in my examination of Ryle's case, to follow the course of Russell's thinking over the decades.

The number of times Russell's name appears in the revised essay rivals that of Ryle's name, with about 170 for the former and 200 for the latter.

Wednesday, May 6, 2020

Footnote ug76

ug76. F.H. Bradley has a sharp retort to the correspondence theory of truth, which he dubs the "copying theory."

...the whole theory goes to wreck in principle and at once on a fatal objection. Truth has to copy facts, but on the other side the facts to be copied show already in their nature the work of truth-making. The merely given facts are, in other words, the imaginary creatures of false theory. They are manufactured by a mind which abstracts one aspect of the concrete known whole, and sets this abstracted aspect out by itself as a real thing. If, on the other hand, we exaggerate when we maintain that all facts are inferences, yet undeniably much of given fact is inferential. And if we cannot demonstrate that every possible piece of fact is modified by apperception, the outstanding residue may at least perhaps be called insignificant. Or (to put it from the other side) if there really is any datum, outward or inward, which, if you remove the work of the mind, would in its nature remain the same, yet there seems no way of our getting certainly to know of this. And, if truth is to copy fact, then truth at least seems to be in fact unattainable. 1
In other words, we have a circular definition here. I believe that Russell said the circularity was "harmless," as no infinite regress is apparent. I see Bradley's observation as pointing to the "negative feedback" of the brain's contact with "the other," something I discuss in

Toward a Signal Model of Perception
https://web.archive.org/web/20200430052605/http://www.angelfire.com/ult/znewz1/qball.html .

This is an old page, which I am anxious to update but thus far have not found the time to do so.
1. First appeared in Mind, April 1908, and reprinted in  Bradley's Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford 1914).

Footnote wp35

wp35. A useful summary of the idealist point of view is F.H. Bradley's article "On Floating Ideas" published in 1908.1

Bradley spotlights "the mistakes which follow from any attempt to sunder the human world, to divide things from ideas, to identify the real with matter of fact, or to set apart somewhere by itself a superior realm of earnest."

Also, "The world of reality, we may say in a word, is the world of values, and values are not judged absolutely but are everywhere measured by degree."
1. First appeared in Mind, April 1908, and reprinted in  Bradley's Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford 1914).

Saturday, May 2, 2020

Footnote ub15

ub15. According to Johann Eduard Erdmann's interpretation, the redoubtable Aristotle fell short of resolving the dualism inherent in the competing strains of previous philosophy. That could not be helped, said Erdmann, because it takes the Christian outlook to resolve dualism.1
But though in all these points his advance upon Plato is indisputable, [Aristotle] nevertheless in one respect remains too close to him to be able to free himself from inconsistencies. For it was only in virtue of the material element he included in the Platonic Ideas, that these became effective forces. And yet this element is excluded from that which is intended to be the most real of real things, viz., the Deity. This was unavoidable, for the time had not yet come for the Deity to be conceived as taking pounos [hardship and toil] upon himself, without which God lives in heartless enjoyment, troubled about nothing, and through which alone He is love and the Creator. What Plato in the Parmenides had beheld only in a passing flash ἑξαιφνης [suddenly] ... viz. the union of rest and motion, enjoyment and labour, is a conception grasped only by the Christian spirit. In common with the whole of antiquity, Aristotle also fails to transcend dualism, because he excludes matter from the Deity, to which it therefore remains opposed, even though reduced to a mere potentiality.
Erdmann's History of Philosophy, which appeared in the 19th Century, is even today rather well regarded. Erdmann obtained a doctoral degree in from the University of Kiel with the treatise, Quidnam sit discrimen philosophiam inter et theologiam (What is the Distinction between Philosophy and Theology?), written in 1830, in which he argued that philosophy and religion converge to a common truth, even though they differ in form of approach, an idea he obtained from Hegel, whose lectures Erdmann rarely if ever missed.

We may consider the probability that the apostle Paul would have viewed Hegelianism as a distraction from the gospel truth.

Colossians 2:8
Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ.
Though Paul was speaking here about some strange occultic brew, it is hard to imagine that he would have accepted Hegel's doctrine as of any use to believers. I can agree with that caution, while at the same time accepting that when Christ is discussed, something useful is likely to come of it. Christ has long been grist for the philosophical mills.

Nevertheless, I do not agree with Hegel or Erdmann that philosophy and theology are two paths to the same (Christian) truth or that they can be two representations of the same truth. In my opinion, no amount of "book learning" (or intellectual knowledge) is equivalent to a direct, personal contact with Jesus Christ, nor can I regard the "World Mind" or "World Spirit" of these gentlemen as being anything like the Holy Spirit (God's mind) that infuses the mind of real followers of Jesus. I also agree with Kierkegaard that the watered-down doctrines of "Christendom" do not in general point the way to an encounter with Christ.

Erdmann was well aware of the opposition to philosophy among such men of faith as Paul of Tarsus and Martin Luther.
If the consciousness of reconciliation with God is the peculiar principle of the Christian spirit, or of Christianity, every age in which this idea agitates men's minds will have to be regarded as coloured with this spirit, or designated as Christian. The same thing must be said of philosophy, when the idea of reconciliation wins a place in it, and when the conception of sin at the same time gains importance, a conception which points back on its part to that of creation. Every philosophy in which this takes place is an expression of the Christian age, and can no longer be reckoned among the systems of antiquity. At the same time it is not only possible, but antecedently probable, that the first who philosophize in this new spirit will be not at all, or at least not very closely, connected with the Christian community. Those members of the com- munity who possess mental endowments great enough to become philosophers, are busied with the proclamation of salvation. And again, the cool reflection, without which a philosophical system cannot be produced, is a proof of lukewarmness in a time when only reckless and fiery zeal (divine foolishness) is considered a sign of the true Christian. In its early days a congregation must be hostile to philosophy; and apostolic natures always will be. Therefore
Paul and Luther
were its antagonists, and the opinion, originally Jewish, that philosophy is a work of evil demons, found favour in the early Church even among the most highly educated, as, for instance, the "Satire" of Hermias proves. Centuries later, Descartes and Spinoza (vid. 266, 267, 271), that is, a Catholic and a Jew, were the first to introduce the spirit of Protestantism into philosophy. For the same reason, heretics and heathen were the first whose philosophy betrays the influence of the Christian spirit.
On this theme, we note J.N. Findlay's observation that Hegel's "whole system may in fact be regarded as an attempt to see the Christian mysteries in everything whatever, every natural process, every form of human activity, and every logical transition." [ Hegel: A Re-Examination by J.N. Findlay (Humanities Press 1970).]

In Hegel and the Hermetic Tradition (Cornell 2001), Glenn Alexander states a case for Hegel as an exponent of a mystic/occult view. If that portrayal is accurate, we may assume that both Luther and Paul would have disfavored such Hegelianism (or any brand of hermeticism), because works rather than grace alone are required for the attainment of a hermetic/gnostic form of reputed divine enlightenment. On the other hand, the doctrine of grace certainly does not preclude the honest believer "working out" his own salvation with Christ's leading.

Philippians 2:12 (King James)
Wherefore, my beloved, as ye have always obeyed, not as in my presence only, but now much more in my absence, work out your own salvation with fear and trembling.

1. History of Philosophy by J.E. Erdmann (London: Swan Sonnenschein; New York: Macmillan English trans. of 4th ed. 1890; Berlin: William Hertz 1866, 1st ed.). Originally published as Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, or "Outline of the History of Philosophy." German "outlines" were meant as aids for university students who would use them as backgrounds for more detailed lectures.

Erdmann's History was a big hit in Germany and later in Britain and America.

I find his observations quite stimulating and not, in general, dated.

Friday, May 1, 2020

Title Goes Here

This is my web page

Footnote Gh19

Gh19. We may safely say that a great many of the major philosophers have sought the nexus point between what the Greeks saw as an opposition of The One versus The Many. The cosmic dichotmomy has also been characterized as Being versus Becoming and Monism versus Pluralism (including Dualism). This hunt, as pursued by Plato, Leibniz, Hegel, Russell, and a legion of others, has never been successful, at least not to the point of consensus. Even Descartes sought the nexus point -- in the pineal gland!

Footnote BT36

BT36. Hegel's dialectical method owes much to the Sophists, Socrates and, in particular, Plato, who saw dialectic as synonymous with philosophy. Hegel of course thought to deal with Kant's antinomies by the idea that contradictories merge in a higher truth -- somewhat like the yin-yang or two-sides-of-the-same-coin idea. But, argued Hegel, Plato's dialectic yields a simplistic reductio ad absurdum argument which in general resolves nothing.

Were not, by modern standards, Hegel so long-winded, he would doubtless get more respect than he does.

In any case, we have J.E. Erdmann's1 take on Platonic dialectics:
It is only when it has been trained in dialectic that the philosophic instinct becomes true philosophy; and hence to philosophize dialectically is also to philosophize truly and rightly (Soph.). It is not therefore the Eros alone that produces the result. If, then, we remember, that in the Symposium Socrates is extolled as the very incarnation of the Eros, this must be considered a proof that Plato regarded the continuation and justification of Socratism by means of Dialectic as the essential advance he had to make. This also explains how Plato could come to regard the dialectical method as equivalent to true knowledge, to use dialectic and philosophy sometimes as synonymous terms, and again employ the word Dialectic to designate that portion of his doctrine which contained the logical basis of the rest. The last is the sense we shall henceforth give to the word.
In passing, one may note Freud's theory of sexual sublimation forecast by Plato.
1. History of Philosophy by J.E. Erdmann (London: Swan Sonnenschein; New York: Macmillan English trans. of 4th ed. 1890; Berlin: William Hertz 1866, 1st ed.). Originally published as Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, or "Outline of the History of Philosophy." German "outlines" were meant as aids for university students who would use them as backgrounds for more detailed lectures.

Erdmann's History was a big hit in Germany and later in Britain and America.

I find his observations quite stimulating and not, in general, dated.

Jung on Wotan