Footnote jg13

---

I find myself in the absurd situation of having to apply footnotes to the footnote.
Use of the Control f function will help.

---

jg.13 Russell once made an interesting point that a system governed by efficient causes is not necessarily precluded from having a final cause [1].

As another illustration we may take the case of mechanism and teleology. A system may be defined as "mechanical" when it has a set of determinants that are purely material, such as the positions of certain pieces of matter at certain times. It is an open question whether the world of mind and matter, as we know it, is a mechanical system or not; let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that it is a mechanical system. This supposition—so I contend—throws no light whatever on the question whether the universe is or is not a "teleological" system. It is difficult to define accurately what is meant by a "teleological" system, but the argument is not much affected by the particular definition we adopt. Broadly, a teleological system is one in which purposes are realised, i.e. in which certain desires those—that are deeper or nobler or more fundamental or more universal or what not—are followed by their realisation. Now the fact—if it be a fact—that the universe is mechanical has no bearing whatever on the question whether it is teleological in the above sense. There might be a mechanical system in which all wishes were realised, and there might be one in which all wishes were thwarted. The question whether, or how far, our actual world is teleological, cannot, therefore, be settled by proving that it is mechanical, and the desire that it should be teleological is no ground for wishing it to be not mechanical.

A somewhat related point: In the Hegelian tradition, the individual is not an automaton. In fact, he is not really an individual. He is the product of the spirit of his age. Being part of a greater whole -- the World Spirit or World Mind -- he is subject to the evolution of this Mind, and so men of one age may be very different from those of another. Marx, while rejecting Hegelian theology, accepted the notion that History molds man. Marx's dialectical materialism was inspired by Hegel's philosophy and was a form of materialism that took a holistic view of human nature and physical dynamics. That is, Marx seemed to believe that the material world did not really work in a Newtonian sense. Neither was he particularly impressed with Darwinism. Marx's theory was picked up by Lenin, who rationalized his revolutionary credo on ground that "the people" could make a "new Soviet man." The state would wither away in a socialist utopia once the human mind had been reshaped so that it was no longer subjected to the illusions fostered by money, property and class.

I mention these points as they are significant sidelights on the issue of mechanism. But Ryle's book offers little or nothing about these matters.

---

1. "On the Notion of Cause" was the presidential address to the Aristotelian Society, November 1912. It appeared in Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays by Bertrand Russell (Allen and Unwin 1918).