Footnote zs94

zs94. On this subject, Russell observes,

When we try to ascertain the motives which have led men to the investigation of philosophical questions, we find that, broadly speaking, they can be divided into two groups, often antagonistic, and leading to very divergent systems. These two groups of motives are, on the one hand, those derived from religion and ethics, and, on the other hand, those derived from science. Plato, Spinoza, and Hegel may be taken as typical of the philosophers whose interests are mainly religious and ethical, while Leibniz, Locke, and Hume may be taken as representatives of the scientific wing. In Aristotle, Descartes, Berkeley, and Kant we find both groups of motives strongly present.

Bertrand Russell
"On Scientific Method in Philosophy"
The Herbert Spencer Lecture, Oxford 1914,
recorded in Mysticism and Logic (Allen and Unwin 1918)

I would agree that Ryle was certainly prompted by a difficulty with religion, as he says in Concept. Yet his book shows very little interest in either. On the other hand, his lack of acquaintance with scientific matters is also evident. Yet the man Ryle sought to have done with, Descartes, gave us his dualism (about which I have serious reservations) because he saw that the mechanistic physics of his day appeared to clash with the theology of the soul. That is, as Russell notes, both the religious/ethical and scientific strains combine in Descartes.

The fact that neither strain is present in Ryle makes one wonder what strain he represents. How can one depose Cartesian dualism while scorning both science and religion?

I suppose one might in some sort of Wittgensteinian sense define the mind away, as did James and Watson before him, by regarding the mind as process only.