Saturday, May 23, 2020

Footnote dh97

dh97. In his introduction to Immortality (Prometheus 1997), Paul Edwards tells us that William James
speaks of the Absolute Mind as "the mother sea" and "the great reservoir of consciousness." He does not explicitly endorse this position, but he writes about it with sympathy and respect. Among Western writers who have endorsed it are the physicist Erwin Schroedinger (1887-1961), known for his momentous contributions to quantum theory, and the influential novelist and political commentator Arthur Koestler (1905-1983). Schroedinger argued that contemporary physical theory which has abandoned the notion that particles are "identifiable individuals" naturally leads to the view taught in the Upanishads that the separation of individual minds is mere appearance and that "in truth there is only one mind." He suggests that at death "the veil of Maya," the deception of which makes us believe in the multiplicity of minds, will be lifted and we will realize that we are part of Brahman, the omnipresent, all-comprehending eternal self of Hinduism. Koestler believed that not only modern physics but also, and especially, the evidence of parapsychology support the view that there is a "psychic substratum," and "all-pervading mind stuff," a "cosmic cosciousness" out of which the "individual consciousnesses are formed and into which they dissolve again after threescore years and ten."
Note that belief in a cosmic mind-matter stuff need not entail belief in God or cosmic consciousness, as we know from Buddhism -- depending on how cosmic consciousness is defined -- and Bertrand Russell in his neutral monism period.

For other footnoted information on Edwards, please see:

Footnote np54
https://thetaman.blogspot.com/2020/05/footnote-np54.html
Footnote ds45
https://thetaman.blogspot.com/2020/05/footnote-ds45.html
Footnote sf51
https://thetaman.blogspot.com/2020/05/footnote-sf51.html
Footnote gk63
https://thetaman.blogspot.com/2020/05/footnote-gk63.html

Friday, May 22, 2020

Footnote YT29

YT29.  We have a dash of ancient Greek Pragmatism from Laws by Plato (Benjamin Jowett translation):
Athenian stranger
The view which identifies the pleasant and the pleasant and the just and the good and the noble has an excellent moral and religious tendency. And the opposite view is most at variance with the designs of the legislator, and is, in his opinion, infamous; for no one, if he can help, will be persuaded to do that which gives him more pain than pleasure. But as distant prospects are apt to make us dizzy, especially in childhood, the legislator will try to purge away the darkness and exhibit the truth; he will persuade the citizens, in some way or other, by customs and praises and words, that just and unjust are shadows only, and that injustice, which seems opposed to justice, when contemplated by the unjust and evil man appears pleasant and the just most unpleasant; but that from the just man's point of view, the very opposite is the appearance of both of them.
Cleinius, a Cretan
True.
Athenian
And which may be supposed to be the truer judgment -- that of the inferior or of the better soul?
Cleinus
Surely, that of the better soul.
Athenian
Then the unjust life must not only be more base and depraved, but also more unpleasant than the just and holy life?
Cleinius
That seems to be implied in the present argument.
Athenian
And even supposing this were otherwise, and not as the argument has proven, still the lawgiver, who is worth anything, if he ever ventures to tell a lie to the young for their good, could not invent a more useful lie than this, or one which will have a better effect in making them do what is right, not on compulsion but voluntarily.

Thursday, May 21, 2020

Footnote vp57

vp57. A footnote appearing in The Evolution of the Soul by Richard Swinburne (Oxford 1986) reads:
That the human soul (the rational or intellectual soul as the medievals called it) comes into being (connected to the body) sometime between conception and birth is the traditional Catholic doctrine. The human soul is present when there is specifically human functioning. In the last century or two it has become normal for Catholic writers and pronouncements to assume that the soul comes into being at conception. St. Thomas Aquinas on the other hand held that the fertilized egg began to grow first as an animal (or, alternatively, first as a living non-conscious thing and then as an animal), and later as a human; that is, it was animated first by a sensitive soul (or first by a vegetative soul and then by a sensitive soul) and only later by an intellectual soul (see Summa Theologiea, Ia, 76. ad 3 and IIa, IIae, 64. 1). Aquinas owed this view to Aristotle. It was listed as an error by Pope Leo XIII in 1887 (H. Denzinger, Enchiridion Symbolorum, 1910). Aquinas would not have denied that abortion was wrong, even when (because done soon after conception) it was not the killing of a human being and so murder. He would have said it was still wrong owing to it being the destruction of a potential human being, or the frustration of a natural process. Aquinas's view that the human foetus is animated by a human soul only at some time much later than conception, seems to have been the general view of the Western Church until the nineteenth century -- see G.R. Dunstan, 'The Moral Status of the Human Embryo -- a Tradition Recalled', Journal of Medical Ethics, 1984, I, 38-44.

Footnote FT11

FT11. E.R. Dodds tells of how Greece's Classical Age "inherited a whole series of inconsistent pictures of the 'soul' or 'self' -- the living corpse in the grave, the shadowy image in Hades, the perishable breath that is spilt in the air or absorbed in the aether, the daemon that is reborn in other bodies." In other words, the Greeks went from the Stone Age theory of the corpse as continuing some form of life, to the idea of the breath/spirit to the spirit/soul with a potential for immortality. Dodds conjectured that the spirit/soul theory was borrowed from Asian shamanism when the Greeks settled along the coasts of the Black Sea in the seventh century b.c.

The Greeks and the Irrational (UCal Press 1951) by Dodds is a brilliant analytical survey of the irrational side(s) of the Greek mind.

Tuesday, May 19, 2020

Footnote ce71

ce71. Facts, argued F.H. Bradley, are founded on fallible human perception. Hence any human-perceived fact or truth is subject to the possibility of error.
The absolute indispensable fact is in my view the mere creature of false theory. Facts are valid so far as, when taken otherwise than as real, they bring disorder into my world. And there are to-day for me facts such that, if I take them as mistakes, my known world is damaged and, it is possible, ruined. But how does it follow that I cannot to-morrow on the strength of new facts gain a wider order in which these old facts can take a place as errors? The supposition may be improbable, but what you have got to show is that it is in principle impossible. A foundation used at the beginning does not in short mean something fundamental at the end, and there is no single fact which in the end can be called fundamental absolutely. It is all a question of relative contribution to my known world-order.

'Then no judgement of perception will be more than probable?'  Certainly that is my contention. Facts are justified because and as far as, while taking them as real, I am better able to deal with the incoming new facts and in general to make my world wider and more harmonious. The higher and wider my structure, and the more that any particular fact or set of facts is implied in that structure, the more certain are the structure and the facts. And, if we could reach an all-embracing ordered whole, then our certainty would be absolute. But, since we cannot do this, we have to remain content with relative probability.
So here Bradley not only reveals himself as a probabilist, we also see that he insists on the relativity of truth despite his strong disagreement with Pragmatism. Bradley was writing in "On Truth and Coherence," which first appeared in Mind, July 1909, and which was republished in Bradley's Essays on Truth and Reality  (Oxford 1914).

Friday, May 15, 2020

Footnote hp35

 
hp35. F.H. Bradley argued that pluralism, as advocated by James, is flawed.
For, if in change something really is altered, and, if the alteration can consist merely in difference of position, and if in this difference the terms and the relations are neither of them altered then either we have an alteration where nothing is changed, or else our premisses have been wrong. Something, if so (we shall have to allow), is concerned in the change, which something is more than and other than the elements admitted by Pluralism. If (to repeat) you hold to reality in the form of external terms and relations, you must deny the ultimate reality of change as actually given. If, on the other hand, you affirm this latter, you must insist that the experience of change is a non-relational totality. And, if so, terms and relations become, as such, abstractions, constructions, true perhaps or perhaps vicious, but assuredly in neither case things, as such, actually experienced. How it is possible to avoid this dilemma and simply to maintain both theses at once, I myself do not know, but apparently nothing less is required for the position taken by Prof. James.
Bradley's criticism also applied to another pluralist, Russell, with whom he held a long-running controversy over the reality of relations. Bradley's remark above appeared in "Appendix III to Chapter V" in his Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford 1914). Bradley was challenging James's views as expressed in Essays in Radical Empiricism, "Essay III"  (published posthumously by Longmans, Green in 1912) and in A Pluralistic Universe (Longmans, Green 1909).

Bradley went on to say,
The doctrine which Prof. James would, I think, have preferred is the view that given experience is non-relational, that it is an unbroken fluid totality containing in one now an undivided lapse, and is in itself foreign to any terms or relations as such. This I also have taken to be the true account of the matter; and what I would notice here is the fact, that, while urging this view as a fatal objection ignored by Absolutism and Idealism, Prof. James might, like others, have himself learnt it at the very source where according to him it is most unknown. The doctrine in question, Prof. James stated very candidly, has been advocated by myself since 1883. He seems even to give me the credit of having broken away here from the tradition of my school, and of having, conjointly with M. Bergson though at perhaps an earlier date, originated in modern times the true view ignored by and fatal to idealistic Monism. Now for myself (I am of course not concerned with M. Bergson's attitude) I at once, in the same journal, disclaimed, and I now again emphatically disclaim any such originality.

Thursday, May 14, 2020

Footnote sb81

sb81. I strongly suspect that James's difficulty with Christian doctrine is reflected in the Pragmatist idea of relative truth. If truth is relative, then there is no need to worry that God will judge you by an absolute standard of truth. The same idea very likely occurred to Dewey, who was so strongly influenced by the Darwinian paradigm.

Jung on Wotan